The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games. by Herings, P.J.J. et al.
The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable
Utility Games
P. Jean-Jacques Herings1 Gerard van der Laan2 Dolf Talman3
October 24, 2006
1P.J.J. Herings, Department of Economics and METEOR, Maastricht University, P.O. Box
616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands, e-mail: P.Herings@algec.unimaas.nl. Homepage:
http://www.fdewb.unimaas.nl/algec/. The author would like to thank the Netherlands organi-
zation for Scienti¯c Research (NWO) for ¯nancial support.
2G. van der Laan, Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Free University, De
Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands, e-mail: glaan@feweb.vu.nl
3A.J.J. Talman, Department of Econometrics & Operations Research and CentER, Tilburg
University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, e-mail: talman@uvt.nlAbstract
We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow
for a social structure on any coalition, for instance a network, a hierarchical ordering or
a dominance relation. For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that
coalition is induced by its social structure and is measured by a power function. We call
a payo® vector socially stable if there is a collection of coalitions that can sustain it and
at which all players have the same power. A payo® vector is called economically stable
if it belongs to the core of the superadditive cover of the game. The socially stable core
consists of the socially and economically stable payo® vectors.
We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the game itself is socially stable.
The socially stable core consists of a ¯nite number of faces of the set of economically
stable payo® vectors. Generically, it consists of a ¯nite number of payo® vectors. Convex
TU-games have a non-empty socially stable core, irrespective of the underlying social
structure. When the game is permutationally convex, the socially stable core is shown to
be non-empty if the power vectors are permutationally consistent and is shown to contain a
unique element if the power vectors are permutationally compatible. We demonstrate the
usefulness of the concept of the socially stable core by applying it to structured hierarchy
games. We also present applications concerning sequencing games and the distribution of
water.
JEL classi¯cation: C60, C70, D70
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A situation in which a ¯nite set of players can obtain certain payo®s by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. In a
TU-game players only di®er with respect to their position in the game. Examples of mod-
els in which players not only di®er with respect to their position in the game, but also
are part of some relational structure (which possibly a®ects the cooperation possibilities
or payo® distributions) are games in coalition structure and games with limited communi-
cation structure. In games with coalition structure it is assumed that the set of players
is partitioned into disjoint sets which represent social groups. For a particular player it is
more easy to cooperate with players in his own group than to cooperate with players in
other groups (see, e.g., Aumann and Drµ eze (1974), Owen (1977), Hart and Kurz (1983) and
Winter (1989)). In games with limited communication structure the edges of an undirected
graph on the set of players represent binary communication links between the players such
that players can cooperate only if they are connected (see, e.g. Myerson (1977), Kalai,
Postlewaite and Roberts (1978), Owen (1986) and Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992)).
Another line of research in the ¯eld of cooperative games are situations in which the
players are part of some hierarchical structure such as games with a permission structure. In
such games it is assumed that players in a TU-game are part of a hierarchical organization
in which there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed
to cooperate within a coalition, see for instance Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992)
and van den Brink and Gilles (1996). Related is also the model of Faigle and Kern (1992)
who consider feasible rankings of the players. Demange (2004) provides a rationale for the
fact that a hierarchical structure is a widespread organizational form in many areas.
In this paper we consider TU-games with an exogenously given social structure on
any subset of the players, for instance a network, a hierarchical ordering or some dominance
relation. We assume that for every coalition the underlying social structure is represented
by a power vector, whose components re°ect the strengths of the individual members of
the coalition within the social structure. From the literature several methods are known to
measure the power of the individual members. The power vector of a coalition is completely
determined by the social structure along which the coalition is organized.
The concept of socially stable core has been introduced in Herings, van der Laan
and Talman (2003) within the more general framework of structured games with non-
transferable utility. For a payo® vector to be in the socially stable core, there should be
neither incentives to deviate from an economic point of view, nor from a social one. A
payo® vector is economically stable if it is feasible and undominated, i.e. when the payo®
vector is in the superadditive cover core of the game, and therefore in the core whenever the
game is superadditive. No player has an incentive to deviate from a core payo® vector from
1an economic point of view. Socially motivated deviations do not occur when all individuals
are equally powerful at the proposed payo® vector. This is formalized by considering the
power vectors of all coalitions that could realize the proposed payo® vector for its members.
If there is a weighted sum of these power vectors that gives all individuals the same power,
then individuals are said to be equally powerful at the proposed payo® and the payo®
vector is called socially stable. The socially stable core consists of all payo® vectors that
are both economically and socially stable. In Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2003),
the property of social stability for a socially structured non-transferable utility game has
been de¯ned, and games satisfying this property are referred to as socially stable NTU-
games. It has been shown that a socially stable game always has a non-empty socially
stable core.
In this paper we consider the class of socially structured TU-games. We show that
any convex game has a non-empty socially stable core. When the game is permutationally
convex for some permutation, the socially stable core is shown to contain the corresponding
marginal vector if the power vectors are permutationally consistent with respect to this
permutation. When the game is permutationally convex and the power vectors are per-
mutationally compatible for some permutation, the corresponding marginal vector is the
unique element of the socially stable core. In general, the socially stable core consists of a
¯nite union of (disjoint) faces of the set of economically stable payo® vectors. Moreover, it
is proved that, generically, the socially stable core consists of a ¯nite number of elements
only. We demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of the socially stable core by applying
it to structured hierarchy games, in which the underlying social structure of the whole set
of players is a hierarchy and the social structure of any subset of players is induced by it.
For power vectors representing this hierarchy, we prove that the socially stable core consists
of only one element, if the game is superadditive. Finally, we consider some applications
in which the hierarchy on the players is a linear order that arises from the characteristics
of the economic situation. These applications concern sequencing games and the water
distribution problem.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries. In Sec-
tion 3 socially structured transferable utility games are introduced as well as the associated
solution concept of the socially stable core. In Section 4 the main theorems are presented.
Section 5 studies structured hierarchy games, Section 6 sequencing games, and Section 7
the water distribution problem. Section 8 concludes.
22 Preliminaries
A situation in which a ¯nite set of players can obtain certain payo®s by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being a
pair (N;v), with N = f1;2:::;ng a ¯nite set of n players and v:2N ! I R a characteristic
function assigning to any coalition S µ N of players a real number v(S) as the worth of
coalition S with v(;) = 0, i.e. the members of coalition S can obtain a total payo® of
v(S) by agreeing to cooperate. In this paper we assume that N is a ¯xed set of players.
We therefore denote a game (N;v) shortly by its characteristic function v. A TU-game
v is superadditive if v(S [ T) ¸ v(S) + v(T) for any pair of subsets S;T µ N such that
S \ T = ;. Further, a TU-game v is convex if v(S [ T) + v(S \ T) ¸ v(S) + v(T) for all
S;T µ N.
A payo® vector is a vector x 2 I R
n assigning payo® xi to player i 2 N. For a vector
y 2 I R
n, y(S) =
P
i2S yi denotes the sum over S of the components of y. A solution F
assigns a set F(v) ½ I R
n of payo® vectors to every TU-game v. A well-known set-valued
solution is the core, assigning to every game v the (possibly empty) set
C(v) = fx 2 I R
n j x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ¸ v(S); for all S µ Ng:
It is well-known that the core of a TU-game v is non-empty if and only if v is balanced
(see Bondareva (1963)).
A more general notion of core is obtained by considering payo® con¯gurations. The
concept of payo® con¯guration was used by Aumann and Maschler (1964) when introducing
the notion of bargaining set, see also e.g. Owen (1982) or Friedman (1989). A payo®
con¯guration of a TU-game v is a pair (x;¦), where x is a payo® vector and ¦ a partition
fS1;:::;Smg of N, satisfying x(Sj) = v(Sj), for all j = 1;:::;m. Let PC be the set of
all payo® con¯gurations. A payo® con¯guration (x;¦) is undominated if x(S) ¸ v(S) for
all S µ N. We now may de¯ne the superadditive cover as the set of all payo® vectors of
undominated payo® con¯gurations. Denoting this set as e C(v), we have that
e C(v) = fx 2 I R
n j9 ¦ s.t. (x;¦) 2 PC and x(S) ¸ v(S); for all S µ Ng:
Notice that e C(v) = C(e v), where e v is the characteristic function given by the superadditive
cover of v,





with ¦jS the collection of all partitions of S, i.e. the set of payo® vectors of undominated
payo® con¯gurations is equal to the core of its superadditive cover. When the game v is
superadditive and thus e v = v, it holds that e C(v) = C(e v) = C(v). It is for this reason that
the results carry over to this more general core notion.
3Aumann and Drµ eze (1974) take a ¯xed partition structure, say B 2 ¦jN, and de¯ne
the core under partition structure B, denoted by C(v;B), as the set of undominated payo®
vectors satisfying x(S) = v(S) for all S 2 B. When e v(N) =
P
S2B v(S), it holds that
C(v;B) = e C(v) = C(e v). For a payo® vector x in e C(v) and for any partition B 2 ¦jN
satisfying
P
S2B v(S) = e v(N) we have that x(S) = v(S) for all S 2 B.
An important point-valued solution is the Shapley value. This value can be de¯ned
in several ways, for instance as a weighted sum of the so-called marginal contributions (see
Shapley (1953)) or as an equal distribution of the so-called Harsanyi dividends of coalitions
(see Harsanyi (1959)) among the players in the coalitions. Because of reasons later on in
this paper, we use here the concept of marginal vector to de¯ne the Shapley value. For
a permutation ¼:N ! N, assigning rank number ¼(i) 2 N to any player i 2 N, de¯ne
¼i = fj 2 Nj¼(j) · ¼(i)g, i.e. ¼i is the set of all players with rank number at most equal
to the rank number of i, including i himself. Then the marginal value vector m¼(v) 2 I R
n
of game v and permutation ¼ is given by
m
¼
i (v) = v(¼
i) ¡ v(¼
i n fig); i 2 N;
and thus assigns to player i his marginal contribution to the worth of the coalition consisting
of all his predecessors in ¼. The Shapley value is equal to the average of the marginal value
vectors over all permutations. When v is convex, the core of v is equal to the convex hull
of all marginal value vectors and thus the Shapley value is in the core.
A game v is permutationally convex, see Granot and Huberman (1982), if there exists
a permutation ¼ such that for all 1 · j < k < n it holds that max[v(S); v(¼j[S)¡v(¼j)] ·
v(¼k[S)¡v(¼k) for all S ½ Nn¼k. When a game v is permutationally convex with respect
to the permutation ¼, it holds that the corresponding marginal vector m¼(v) is in the core
and, hence, the core is non-empty.
3 Structured TU-Games
Following Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2003) for games with non-transferable utility,
we assume in this paper that in a transferable utility game any subset of agents, including
the grand coalition, is internally organized according to some social structure. A social
structure could be a communication network (e.g., see Myerson, 1977), a hierarchy with a
principal at the top and a function allocating to any of the other players a unique superior
such that from each such player there is a unique path to the principal, or some other
more general dominance relation. On any proper coalition, the social structure could be
completely induced by the social structure on the grand coalition, as is often the case in
models of network formation (e.g., see Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), but it is also allowed
4that the social structure on a coalition is not induced by the social structure on the grand
coalition but instead for instance is the most e±cient internal organization for the coalition
itself. In this paper we assume that the social structures on all the coalitions are given
exogeneously and that the characteristic function v assigns to any coalition S the value
v(S) of the coalition S when organized according to its given social structure.
We assume that for every coalition S there is a power vector p(S) that represents
the strength of the position of every player i 2 S within the underlying social structure
of coalition S. In case the social structure is given by a directed or undirected graph on
the set of players, we may use one of the power measures known from the literature. A
well-known power measure is the degree or score measure, see e.g. Rubinstein (1980).
According to this measure the power of a node in a given graph is equal to its (out)degree,
being the number of edges in the graph to which the node is incident or in case of a directed
graph the number of edges leaving the node. Other power measures for directed graphs
have been proposed in for instance van den Brink and Gilles (2000) and Herings, van der
Laan and Talman (2005). In the latter paper, the positional power of a player in a directed
graph takes into account the power of its successors and in a hierarchy the resulting power
vector has the property that every player has more power than any of his successors. In
case of undirected graphs, any of the so-called centrality measures may be used as a way
to measure the power of a player.
A (socially) structured TU-game can therefore be described by a ¯nite set of players,
N = f1;:::;ng, a characteristic function v : 2N ! I R, assigning to any coalition S its
value v(S), and a social structure on every coalition, represented by a power function
p : N ! I R
n, assigning to every coalition S the power vector p(S) of its players within
the underlying social structure of S, where N = 2N nf;g is the collection of all non-empty
subsets of N. It is assumed that both the characteristic function and the social structure
(or equivalently its corresponding power vector) are exogenously given. For mathematical
reasons we take the power vector p(S) in I R
n and not in I R
jSj. For a power vector p(S) of
coalition S it holds that p(S) is a nonnegative vector in I R
n, pi(S) = 0 for any i not in
S, and pi(S) > 0 for at least one player i in S. We now have the following de¯nition of a
structured TU-game (STG).
De¯nition 3.1 (Structured TU-Game)
A structured TU-game is given by the triple ¡ = (N;v;p) with N a ¯nite set of players, v
a characteristic function, and p a power function.
In a structured TU-game we are interested in payo® vectors that are socially and
economically stable. If for some payo® vector x 2 I R
n and coalition S 2 N it holds that
x(S) · v(S), then coalition S can obtain value x(S) without cooperating with players
5outside S and we say that coalition S sustains x. If within coalition S an individual at
payo® vector x, sustained by S, has more power than some of the other individuals in S
and x cannot be sustained by any other coalition, then this individual is able to increase
his payo® at the expense of these other individuals. The payo® vector x is in that case
not socially stable. This process can only be stopped by a credible threat of some of the
other individuals to form another coalition. Such a threat is only credible if the deviating
individuals can guarantee their coalition members at least the same payo® as before, and
have the power to enforce the outcome that leads to these payo®s.
A payo® vector x is called socially stable if nonnegative real numbers or weights can
be assigned to the coalitions S sustaining x in such a way that the weighted total power
of every agent is equal to 1 and thus each agent has the same power. In the sequel, for
S 2 N, let eS 2 I R
n denote the vector given by eS
i = 1 when i 2 S and eS
i = 0 otherwise.
De¯nition 3.2 (Socially Stable Payo®)
For a structured TU-game ¡ = (N;v;p), a payo® vector x 2 I R






has a nonnegative solution.
Notice that a payo® vector x satisfying x(N) · v(N) is socially stable whenever
p(N) = eN: The next example shows that this may not hold when p(N) 6= eN: In this
example and also in later examples we often use, for ease of notation, as argument of v
and p the elements of S instead of the set S itself.
Example 3.3 Take N = f1;2;3g, v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0, v(1;2) = 4, v(1;3) = v(2;3) =
2 and v(1;2;3) = 5, and p(i) = efig for i = 1;2;3, p(1;2) = (2;1;0)>, p(1;3) = (2;0;1)>,
p(2;3) = (0;1;2)> and p(N) = (3;2;1)>. Consider the payo® vector x = (2;2;1)>. Then
x(S) · v(S) for S = f1;2g and S = N. Clearly, eN is not a nonnegative combination
of p(1;2) and p(N), so x is not socially stable. Observe that for any S sustaining this x
it holds that p1(S) > p2(S) > p3(S). When we increase at x the payo® to player 1 at
the expense of for instance player 2 until y = (3;1;1)>, then y(S) · v(S) for S = f1;2g,
S = f2;3g and S = N. Now eN is a nonnegative linear combination of p(1;2), p(2;3) and
p(N) and thus y is socially stable. In fact eN is a nonnegative linear combination of only
p(1;2) and p(2;3). As a result any payo® vector x satisfying x(S) · v(S) for S = f1;2g
and S = f2;3g is socially stable, for instance x = (4;0;2)>. 2
In the sequel it will be useful to de¯ne stability of a collection of coalitions without
reference to a particular payo® vector.
6De¯nition 3.4 (Stable Collection of Coalitions)





has a nonnegative solution. A stable collection of coalitions in N is minimal if no proper
subset of it is stable.
A socially stable payo® vector is therefore a payo® vector whose components can be
achieved by every element of some stable collection of coalitions for its members. Observe
that stability of a collection of coalitions reduces to balancedness of the collection when
for every S 2 N it holds that p(S) = eS. In this case every member of a coalition has
the same power. This might happen when for example the social structure of the grand
coalition is a network connecting each pair of agents. In this way stability can be seen as
a generalization of balancedness. In the remaining of this paper we denote the particular
case of balancedness by p = e:
A socially stable payo® vector may not be feasible. A payo® vector x is said to
be feasible if x(N) · e v(N), i.e. when the total payo® can be attained by cooperating
according to some partition of the grand coalition. In Example 3.3 the socially stable
vector (4;0;2)> is not feasible, because x(N) = 6 > 5 = e v(N) = v(N) (because the game
is superadditive). Furthermore, social stability of a payo® vector x does not imply that
x is undominated, i.e. there may exist an S 2 N and y 2 I R
n satisfying y(S) · v(S)
and yi > xi for all i 2 S. A payo® vector that is both feasible and undominated is called
economically stable.
De¯nition 3.5 (Economically Stable Payo®)
For a structured TU-game ¡ = (N;v;p), a payo® vector x 2 I R
n is economically stable if
x(N) = e v(N) and x(S) ¸ v(S) for all S 2 N.
The de¯nition says that a payo® vector x is economically stable if and only if x is
in the superadditive cover core e C(v) of v. The set of all socially and economically stable
payo® vectors is called the socially stable core of the game.
De¯nition 3.6 (Socially Stable Core)
The socially stable core of a structured TU-game ¡ = (N;v;p), to be denoted SC(v;p) for
N, consists of the set of socially and economically stable payo® vectors of ¡.
A payo® vector x therefore lies in the socially stable core if and only if x is feasible
and undominated (economic stability) and can be sustained by a socially stable collection of
7coalitions (social stability). We want to stress that feasibility requires that x(N) · e v(N),
but that sustainability is de¯ned with respect to v. We conclude this section with two
examples. The ¯rst example shows that a core element does not need to be socially stable.
Example 3.7 Consider the game (N;v;p) with N = f1;2;3g, v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0,
v(1;2) = 1, v(1;3) = 2, v(2;3) = 3 and v(N) = 6. The social structure on N is given
by the hierarchy such that agent 1 dominates agent 3 and agent 3 dominates agent 2, e.g.
p1(S) = 3 when 1 2 S, p2(S) = 1 when 2 2 S and p3(S) = 2 when 3 2 S. Clearly, v is
convex and therefore superadditive and thus e v(N) = v(N). The core is given by
C(v) = fx 2 I R
3
+j x1 + x2 + x3 = 6; 0 · x1 · 3; 0 · x2 · 4; 0 · x3 · 5 g:
Take any payo® vector x in the relative interior of C(v). Such a vector can only be sustained
by the grand coalition N. Since pN 6= eN, the collection fNg is not stable and therefore x
is not an element of the socially stable core. As can easily be seen, the only socially stable
element in the core is (3;0;3)>, sustained by the stable collection ff2g;f2;3g;Ng. In this
socially stable core element the weakest agent, agent 2, gets his own value, the middleman,
agent 3, gets his marginal contribution when he joins the weakest agent, and the strongest
agent, agent 1, gets his marginal contribution when he joins the coalition of the weakest
agent and the middleman. 2
The next example considers a game with four players, which is not superadditive.
In particular it stresses the di®erence between feasibility and sustainability by the grand
coalition N.
Example 3.8 Take (N;v;p) with N = f1;2;3;4g, v(1;2) = v(3;4) = 2, v(S) = 2 when
jSj = 3, v(N) = 3 and v(S) = 0 otherwise; and p(1;2) = (2;1;0;0)>, p(3;4) = (0;0;1;2)>
and p(S) = eS for all other S. Clearly e v(N) = 4 and the set of undominated feasible payo®
vectors is given by
e C(v) = C(e v) = fx 2 I R
4
+jx1 + x2 = 2; x3 + x4 = 2g:
Now take any strictly positive vector x 2 e C(v). Then x(S) > v(S) for all S 6= f1;2g; f3;4g.
Since eN cannot be written as a nonnegative linear combination of p(1;2) and p(3;4); x
is not socially stable. In this case, the requirement of social stability removes all strictly
positive vectors from e C(v). It then easily follows that the unique element of SC(v;p) is the
payo® vector x = (2;0;0;2)>. For this payo® vector it holds that x(S) · v(S) when S is
f2g, f3g, f1;2g and f3;4g. Since eN is a nonnegative linear combination of p(1;2), p(3;4),
p(2) and p(3), it holds that x is sustained by the stable collection ff2g;f3g;f1;2g;f3;4gg
and thus x 2 SC(v;p). Observe that for instance x = (0;2;0;2)> is not socially stable,
because p1(1;2) > p2(1;2).
8Notice that not any x 2 e C(v) is socially stable although p(N) = eN. The reason
is that for each x 2 e C(v) it holds that x(N) = e v(N) > v(N) and thus x is not sustained
by N. To obtain total payo® equal to 4, N has to split itself in f1;2g and f3;4g, so x is
sustained by these two coalitions. However, as shown above, the collection of these two
coalitions is not socially stable. 2
4 Non-emptiness of the Socially Stable Core
In this section we give su±cient conditions for the non-emptiness of the socially stable core
of a structured TU-game (N;v;p). When p = e, we always have that SC(v;p) = e C(v). In
case v is also superadditive and thus SC(v;p) = e C(v) = C(v), we know from Bondareva
(1963) that the socially stable core is non-empty if and only if the game is balanced.
However, for an arbitrary power function p and arbitrary game v, the socially stable core is a
subset of the superadditive cover core and might be empty even if the game is superadditive
and balanced. The balancedness condition for superadditive TU-games is not su±cient for
the non-emptiness of the socially stable core when p 6= e. The next de¯nition of social
stability of the game has been given in the NTU-context in Herings, van der Laan and
Talman (2003).
De¯nition 4.1 (Socially Stable Game)
A structured TU-game ¡ = (N;v;p) is socially stable if every socially stable payo® x of ¡
is feasible.
It should be observed that this social stability condition reduces to the usual bal-
ancedness condition of a TU-game when p = e and the game is superadditive. We now
have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2
A structured TU-game ¡ = (N;v;p) has a non-empty socially stable core if ¡ is socially
stable.
Proof. The proof follows from a more general theorem for socially structured NTU-games
given in Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2003). 2
The theorem above requires feasibility to be shown for any socially stable payo®
vector. This may be a demanding task. On the other hand, social stability is su±cient but
not necessary. The next theorem says that for every given power function a convex game
has a non-empty socially stable core. Observe that the proof holds for any game whose
core contains all marginal vectors. However, this does not generalize the result, because a
9game is convex i® the core contains all marginal vectors, see e.g. Ichiishi (1981). Observe
that convexity implies superadditivity, so x(N) = v(N) for any undominated payo® vector.
Theorem 4.3
If v is a convex game, then for every power function p the structured TU-game ¡ = (N;v;p)
has a non-empty socially stable core.
Proof. To prove non-emptiness, we ¯rst construct for a given power function p a stable
collection of coalitions.
Step 1. Set k = 1, Sk = N, qk = eN, and rk = n. Goto Step 2.
Step 2. De¯ne Tk = fj 2 Sk jpj(Sk)=qk
j = maxh2Sk ph(Sk)=qk
hg and tk = jTkj. De¯ne
¸k = (maxh2Sk ph(Sk)=qk
h)¡1. Goto Step 3.
Step 3. For j 2 Tk; de¯ne ¼(j) 2 N such that f¼(j) j j 2 Tkg = frk; rk¡1;:::;rk¡tk+1g.
If rk = tk, de¯ne k¤ = k and stop the procedure; otherwise set k = k + 1 and goto Step 4.
Step 4. Set Sk = Sk¡1 n Tk¡1, qk = qk¡1 ¡ ¸kp(Sk¡1) and rk = rk¡1 ¡ tk¡1 = jSkj > 0.
Return to step 2.
By construction we have that the collection fS1;S2;:::;Sk¤g is a stable collection of coali-
tions and that ¼ = (¼(1);¼(2);:::;¼(n)) is a permutation of the elements of N such that
for any k = 1;:::;k¤ it holds that




Next take the payo® vector x equal to the marginal vector m¼(v). Then it follows for any








j n fjg)) = v(¼
`k) = v(Sk):
By construction of the sets Sk it follows that x is socially stable. Moreover, since v is
convex we also have that x 2 C(v). Hence x 2 SC(v;p). 2
Observe that the marginal vector constructed in the proof is unique if and only if
k¤ = n and thus jTkj = 1 for all k. When for some k, Tk contains multiple players, we can
take any order of the players within Tk in Step 3. So, in general there are ¦k jTkj di®erent
10permutations satisfying the conditions and inducing a marginal vector in SC(v;p). We,
however, remark that di®erent permutations may induce the same marginal vector.
The assumptions in Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 are independent, i.e. socially stability of
¡ does not imply convexity of v and vice versa. Clearly, when p = e, ¡ is socially stable if
and only if v satis¯es balancedness. However, balancedness of v does not imply convexity.
The following example shows that convexity of v does not imply social stability of ¡:
Example 4.4 Take N = f1;2;3g, v(1) = v(3) = v(1;3) = 0, v(2) = v(1;2) = v(2;3) =
v(1;2;3) = 1. Take any power vector function p such that p(1;2) = (2;1;0)> and p(2;3) =
(0;1;2)>. This game is convex, so the socially stable core of ¡ = (N;v;p) is non-empty.
The payo® vector x = (1;0;1)> is socially stable, being sustained by the stable collection
ff1;2g; f2;3gg. However, x is not feasible and thus ¡ = (N;v;p) is not socially stable. 2
Theorem 4.3 states that for convex games v the socially stable core is non-empty
for any power function p: When we make joint assumptions on p and v; it is possible to
weaken the assumptions on the characteristic function v. We ¯rst de¯ne the notion of
¼-consistency.
De¯nition 4.5 A power function p : N ! I R
n is ¼-consistent for a permutation ¼ on N,
when for all coalitions S and for all players i and j in S it holds that ¼(i) < ¼(j) implies
pi(S) · pj(S):
When the power function p is ¼-consistent, the ranking of the players determined by
permutation ¼ is consistent with the ranking of the power of players in any coalition. We
will show that the marginal vector m¼(v) belongs to the socially stable core of ¡ = (N;v;p),
when v is permutationally convex for the permutation ¼ and p is ¼-consistent.
Theorem 4.6 Consider a structured TU-game ¡ = (N;v;p); where, for some permutation
¼ on N; v is permutationally convex and p is ¼-consistent. Then the socially stable core of
¡ contains the vector m¼(v) as an element.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4.3 it can be constructively shown that the collection
f¼i j i 2 Ng is socially stable. Notice that some of the weights might be zero, so the
collection is not necessarily minimal. Take the payo® vector x equal to the marginal vector








j n fjg)) = v(¼
i):
It follows that x is socially stable. Moreover, since v is permutationally convex for the
permutation ¼; it follows from Granot and Huberman (1982) that x 2 C(v): Hence x 2
11SC(v;p): 2
Of course, also under the conditions of Theorem 4.6 the socially stable core may contain
multiple elements. Clearly, when p = e the power function is ¼-consistent for any ¼ and
SC(v;p) = e C(v). However, when the power function p is such that for some permutation ¼
a player i has little power in any coalition involving players from N n¼i; the socially stable
core can be shown to consist of a unique element given by the marginal vector m¼(v): To
make this statement more precise, we introduce the notion of ¼-compatibility.
De¯nition 4.7 A power function p : N ! I R
n is ¼-compatible for a permutation ¼ of N,
when for all players i 2 N and for all coalitions S containing i such that S n ¼i 6= ;; it
holds that pi(S) <
Pn
j=1 pj(S)=n:
When a power function is ¼-compatible, the power of a player i in any coalition that
involves another player that is ranked higher according to ¼; is less than the average power
Pn
j=1 pj(S)=n: Notice that neither ¼-compatibility implies ¼-consistency nor ¼-consistency
implies ¼-compatibility.
Theorem 4.8 Consider a structured TU-game ¡ = (N;v;p); where for some permutation
¼ of N; v is permutationally convex and p is ¼-compatible. Then the socially stable core of
¡ contains the marginal vector m¼(v) as its unique element.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may normalize power functions such that
Pn
j=1 pj(S) =
n and we may assume that the permutation ¼ corresponds to the ordering ¼(i) = n+1¡i,
i = 1;:::;n. Let the payo® vector x belong to SC(v;p) and let fS1;:::;Smg be a sta-
ble collection of coalitions with (¸1;:::;¸m) a vector of nonnegative weights such that
Pm
j=1 ¸jp(Sj) = eN and x(Sj) · v(Sj) for j = 1;:::;m. Notice that
Pm
j=1 ¸j = 1.
We de¯ne the ordering Á` on N by S Á` T if and only if the lowest ranked individual
in S [T not in S \T belongs to S: Without loss of generality, we may choose fS1;:::;Smg
to be minimal, and we can order the coalitions such that Sj Á` Sj+1:
We claim that, for i = 1;:::;m; this stable collection satis¯es i 2 Si ½ fi;:::;ng:
Suppose that fS1;:::;Smg does not contain the singleton coalition fng: Since p is ¼-





a contradiction. Consequently, fS1;:::;Smg does contain the singleton coalition fng; and
by the properties of Á` it follows that Sm = fng:
We now use an induction argument to proceed. Assume it is true that, for some
k0 · m; for k = 1;:::;k0; n ¡ k 2 Sm¡k ½ fn ¡ k;:::;ng: We show that then n ¡ k ¡ 1 2
12Sm¡k¡1 ½ fn ¡ k ¡ 1;:::;ng: Obviously, it is not the case that Sm¡k¡1 ½ fn ¡ k;:::;ng
as this would violate the minimality of fS1;:::;Smg: Suppose it is not true that Sm¡k¡1 ½
fn ¡ k ¡ 1;:::;ng; so the lowest ranked player in Sm¡k¡1 is i0 < n ¡ k ¡ 1: For all Sj; it
holds that pn¡k¡1(Sj) < 1; so 1 =
Pm
j=1 ¸jpn¡k¡1(Sj) < 1; a contradiction. It follows that
the lowest ranked player in Sm¡k¡1 is n¡k ¡1: This completes the proof of the induction
step, and it follows as a corollary that m = n:
It remains to be shown that x = m¼(v): We denote m¼(v) by y:
Obviously, it holds that xn = yn = v(fng): We proceed with an induction argument.
Assume it is true that, for some k0; xi = yi for i = n ¡ k0;:::;n; and
Pn
i=n¡k0 xi =
v(fn ¡ k0;:::;ng): We will show that xn¡k0¡1 = yn¡k0¡1:
Since x is economically stable, it follows that
Pn
i=n¡k0¡1 xi ¸ v(¼k0+1): From the
induction hypothesis that yi = xi for i = n ¡ k0;:::;n; we then obtain xn¡k0¡1 ¸ yn¡k0¡1:
Since y is economically stable, it follows that
P
i2Sn¡k0¡1 yi ¸ v(Sn¡k0¡1) =
P
i2Sn¡k0¡1 xi:
Since n ¡ k0 ¡ 1 2 Sn¡k0¡1 ½ ¼k0+1; it follows that xn¡k0¡1 · yn¡k0¡1: We have shown that
xn¡k0¡1 = yn¡k0¡1: 2
When the power function p is ¼-compatible, any player has so much power compared to
his lower-ranked players that he is able to extract all payo®s from them, up to the point
where the lower-ranked players could form a deviating coalition. The socially stable core
consists of a unique element, corresponding to the marginal vector m¼(v): We come back
to this property in the next sections.
In general the socially stable core consists of a ¯nite number of faces of e C(v). To
show this, for a collection of coalitions F ½ N, de¯ne
C
F(v) = fx 2 e C(v) j x(S) = v(S) for all S 2 Fg;
i.e., CF(v) is a (possibly empty) face of e C(v). Clearly, when x 2 SC(v;p) lies in the
(relative) interior of CF(v), then due to the linearity of the constraints every point of the
face CF(v) belongs to SC(v;p). The next example shows a socially stable core consisting
of two disjoint faces.
Example 4.9 Take N = f1;2;3g, v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0, v(1;2) = 4, v(1;3) = 1,
v(2;3) = 3, v(1;2;3) = 6. Since the game is superadditive, e C(v) = C(v) = fx 2 I R
3j x1 +
x2 + x3 = 6; 0 · x1 · 3; 0 · x2 · 5; 0 · x3 · 2g. Take p(1;2) = (3;1;0)>, p(1;3) =
(2;0;1)>, p(2;3) = (0;1;3)>, p(1;2;3) = (2;3;1)>. For this power function the socially
stable core SC(v;p) consists of two zero-dimensional faces of the core, one being the vertex
(3;1;2)> and the other one being the marginal vector (1;5;0)>. The vector (3;1;2)> is
sustained by the stable collection B1 = ff1;2;3g; f1;2g; f2;3gg and the vector (1;5;0)>
by the stable collection B2 = ff1;2;3g; f1;3g; f3gg. 2
13The example shows the generic case that the socially stable core consists of zero-
dimensional faces of e C(v) and thus consists of a ¯nite number of payo® vectors. To prove
this, observe that once the number of players is ¯xed, a structured TU-game is completely
determined by the tuple of payo®s v; which can be represented by a vector in I R
2n¡1; and
the tuple of power functions, which can be represented by a vector in S(2n¡1)n; the unit
simplex in I R
(2n¡1)n: The Euclidean topology and Lebesgue measure on I R
2n¡1 £ S(2n¡1)n
therefore induce a topology and a measure on structured TU-games.
Theorem 4.10 Let N be the set of players. Then there is an open set of payo®s and
power functions with full Lebesgue measure V £ P such that for any (v;p) 2 V £ P; the
socially stable core of the structured TU-game ¡ = (N;v;p) is either empty or consists of
a ¯nite number of elements.
Proof. De¯ne the closed subset W of I R








Next we de¯ne the open subset V of I R
2n¡1 with full measure by
V = fv 2 I R
2n¡1 j 8(S1;:::;Sn) 2 N
n with Sj 6= Sj0 when j 6= j
0; (vS1;:::;vSn) = 2 Wg:
Finally, we de¯ne the open subset P of S(2n¡1)n with full measure as the set of vectors
p = (p(S))S2N for which it holds that any selection of n vectors from the vectors p(S);
S 2 N; and eN yields an independent set of vectors.
We now examine the socially stable core for the structured TU-game ¡ = (N;v;p);
where (v;p) 2 V £ P: All socially stable core elements are obtained by considering, for
all minimal stable collections of coalitions fS1;:::;Smg; the solutions to the system of
equations
x(Sj) = v(Sj); j = 1;:::;m:
In fact, the union over all stable collections of solutions to the corresponding system is a
superset of the socially stable core. Since fS1;:::;Smg is a stable collection, there exists a





Moreover, fS1;:::;Smg is minimal, so that the vectors p(Sj) are independent, and in
particular m · n: Since p 2 P; it holds that m = n:
Consider the system of equations,
x(Sj) = v(Sj); j = 1;:::;n:
14If the vectors eSj;j 2 N, are all independent, it follows that this system has exactly one so-
lution, and therefore we obtain at most one socially stable core element. When the vectors
eSj;j 2 N; are not all independent, it follows from the de¯nition of V that this system of
equations has no solution. Hence, there is at most one solution for each minimal stable col-
lection. Since the number of minimal stable collections is ¯nite, this proves the theorem. 2
Theorem 4.10 shows that in general the socially stable core re¯nes the superadditive cover
core to a great extent. There is typically only a ¯nite number of payo® vectors in the
socially stable core.
5 Structured hierarchy games
A hierarchical structure is a widespread organizational form in many areas. A hierarchy
on N is represented by a tree on N. A tree is a directed graph on N such that there is one
top-player, say player 1, and for each player i 6= 1 there is a unique path of directed edges
(i1;i2);:::;(ij¡1;ij) such that i1 = 1 and ij = i. Following Myerson (1977) we assume that
players can't cooperate when they are not connected. This yields the so-called restricted







where C(S) is the collection of maximally connected subsets of S in the graph. Clearly in
a hierarchy graph we have that a subset S of nodes is connected if and only if there is a
unique player j 2 S such that for any other player i 2 S there is a unique path of directed
edges in the graph from j to i and all players on each of these paths are also in S. From
Kaneko and Wooders (1982) and Le Breton, Owen and Weber (1992) it follows that C(e vr)
is not empty, i.e., the core of the restricted game of the superadditive cover of v is not
empty, see also Demange (1994), who shows that C(vr) is not empty if v is superadditive.
From this Demange (2004) argues that hierarchies yield stability, providing a rationale for
the fact that a group organizes itself in hierarchies so as to achieve coordination.
In this section we consider structured hierarchy games. In such games the social
structure on the set N of agents is given by a hierarchy on N and the social structure on
any subset S is induced by this hierarchy. The characteristic function re°ects the hierarchy,
in the sense that v = vr. The power function re°ects the hierarchy in the sense that a
player has a higher power than any of its subordinates. To be more precise, for i 2 N, let
D(i) denote the set of subordinates of player i, i.e. for each j 2 D(i) there is a unique
directed path from i to j. Then the power vector for the whole set of players is a vector
15p(N) such that for each i and j it holds that pi(N) > pj(N) whenever j 2 D(i), i.e., the
top player 1 has the highest power and the power is strictly decreasing when descending
in the hierarchy. A natural example is pi(N) = jD(i)j+1 for all i 2 N, i.e., the power of a
player is equal to the number of its subordinates including itself. Further, for any S ½ N
and i 2 S we take pi(S) = pi(N), although it is su±cient assume that pi(S) > pj(S)
whenever j 2 D(i) and i 2 S. We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 Consider a structured hierarchy TU-game ¡ = (N;v;p) where v is super-
additive. Then the socially stable core of ¡ contains the vector x¤, with
x
¤
j = v(D(j) [ fjg) ¡ v(D(j)); for all j 2 N; (1)
as its unique element.
Proof. Let ¼ be any permutation on N such that for all i and j it holds that ¼(j) < ¼(i)
when pj(N) < pi(N). Clearly, the collection f¼1;:::;¼ng is stable. In Demange (2004)
it has been shown that m¼(v) 2 C(v). Since v = vr, we have that x¤ = m¼(v), being
sustained by the stable collection f¼1;:::;¼ng. Therefore x¤ is an element of the socially
stable core. So, it remains to be proven that x¤ is the unique socially stable element of the
core for any power function p re°ecting the hierarchy. Let x be an arbitrary element of
the socially stable core and let B = fS1;:::;Smg be a stable collection sustaining x. For
i 6= 1, let b(i) be the unique predecessor of i in the hierarchy and de¯ne b(1) = 0. Recall
that player 1 is the topman of the hierarchy. Since pb(i)(S) > pi(S) for any S with b(i) 2 S,
for every player i 2 N it must hold that there exists an index h(i) 2 f1;:::;mg such that
i 2 Sh(i) and b(i) = 2 Sh(i). Since D(i) is the number of subordinates of player i 2 N, we
have that jD(i)j = 0 when i is a leave (being a node without subordinates), jD(1)j = n¡1,
and jD(j)j > jD(i)j for all j and i 2 D(j). We proceed now by induction on jD(i)j. Let
node i be a leave, i.e., D(i) = ;. Notice that in a hierarchy such a node always exists.
Then fig is a component of Sh(i) in the graph, since b(i) = 2 Sh(i). From (i) x is sustained by
Sh(i), (ii) x is in the core and (iii) v = vr it follows that xi = v(i), and thus xi = x¤
i when
jD(i)j = 0.
Now, let xi = x¤
i for any player i 2 N with jD(i)j · k for some k, 0 · k < n ¡ 1.
When there is no player j 2 N with jD(j)j = k +1, then xi = x¤
i also holds for any player
i 2 N with jD(i)j · k + 1. Otherwise, let j 2 N be any player with jD(j)j = k + 1.
Since Sh(j) sustains x and x is in the core, we have that x(Sh(j)) = v(Sh(j)). Since v = vr,
it holds that v(Sh(j)) is equal to the sum of the values of all the components of Sh(j) in
the graph. Together with the fact that x is in the core this implies that x(S) = v(S)
for any component S in the graph of Sh(j). Let C(j) be the component of Sh(j) in the
graph containing j. For any i 2 N, de¯ne D0(i) = D(i) [ fig. Since b(j) = 2 Sh(j) we have
16that C(j) ½ D0(j). Moreover, because of the tree structure and the fact that j 2 C(j),
we have that Sh(j) n C(j) is partitioned in a collection of components fD0(i1);:::;D0(il)g
with is 2 D(j) for all s = 1;:::;l. Because of the induction hypothesis we have that
x(D0(is)) = x¤(D0(is)) = v(D0(is)) for all s. Hence,
x(D












where the ¯rst inequality follows from the superadditivity of v and the latter inequality
from the fact that x is in the core. Hence x(D0(j)) = v(D0(j)).
To complete the proof, observe that D(j) is partitioned in the graph in a collection
of components fD0(j1):::;D0(jk)g, where fj1;:::;jkg is the set of followers of j. From












= v(D(j) [ fjg) ¡ v(D(j)) = x
¤
j;
where the second last equality comes from the fact that v = vr. This proves the induction
step. Since the number of players is ¯nite this completes the proof. 2
We remark that the permutation ¼ for which x¤ = m¼(v) is in general not unique. Ev-
ery permutation ¼ that satis¯es the condition in the proof yields x¤ as marginal vector.
The same holds for the choice of the power vectors. Every power vector p(N) satisfying
pi(N) > pj(N) whenever j 2 D(i), yields the same socially stable core, consisting of the
unique element x¤. The outcome x¤ is very natural. Every individual receives a payo® equal
to what he is contributing when he joins his subordinates. The core typically also contains
other elements than the vector x¤ = m¼(v). In particular, following Demange (2004), we
can replace the hierarchy graph by a communication graph by replacing all directed edges
by undirected edges. Then we can choose arbitrarily some other player and reconstruct a
new directed graph with this player as the top-player. Clearly, also the marginal vector
with respect to a permutation re°ecting this new directed graph is in the core of the game.
So, for a given topman, the socially stable core with respect to a power function re°ecting
the corresponding hierarchy reduces the core containing several marginal vectors to one
marginal vector. The next sections discuss some examples when the hierarchy is a linear
order.
176 Sequencing games
A one-machine sequencing situation, see e.g. Curiel (1988) or Hamers (1995) is described
as a triple (N;q;c), where N = f1;:::;ng is the set of jobs in a queue to be processed,
q 2 I R
n
+ is an n-vector with qi the processing time of job i and c = (ci)i2N is a collection of
cost functions ci:I R+ ! I R+, specifying the costs ci(t) when t is the total time needed to
complete job i. For an ordering ½ on N describing the positions of the jobs in the queue,
the completion time of job i is given by Ti(½) =
P
fjj½(j)·½(i)g qj, i.e. the completion time
is the sum of its waiting time and its own processing time, and the costs of processing i
are given by Ci(½) = ci(Ti(½)). The total costs of a coalition S µ N given an ordering ½
are equal to CS(½) =
P
i2S Ci(½). In the sequel we assume without loss of generality that
the initial positions of the jobs in the queue are given by the ordering ½0 with ½0(i) = i for












qj); S µ N:
Now, each coalition S of jobs can obtain cost savings by rearranging the jobs among the
members of S. Then the minimal cost of the grand coalition is given by
CN = min
½ CN(½):
However, members of any other coalition S can only rearrange their positions under the
condition that the members of S are not allowed to `jump' over jobs outside S. So, an
ordering ½ is admissible for S if for any j 62 S the set of its predecessors does not change
with respect to the initial situation, i.e. if for any j 62 S it holds that fk 2 N j ½(k) <
½(j)g = fk 2 N j ½0(k) < ½0(j)g = fk 2 N j k < jg. Let A(S) be the set of admissible




This gives the cost savings sequencing game (N;v) with N the set of jobs as the set of
players and characteristic function v given by
v(S) = CS(½
0) ¡ CS; S µ N:
In the following, we use the terminology players instead of jobs. Obviously, since for
any S only orderings in A(S) are admissible, only connected coalitions (i.e. coalitions of
consecutive players) can realise cost reductions. For i < j, denote the set fi;i+1;:::;jg of
consecutive players by [i;j] and let L denote the set of all coalitions of consecutive players,
i.e.
L = fT 2 N j T = [i;j]; 1 · i · j · ng:
18For some S 2 N, let P(S) be the unique minimal partition of S in coalitions of
consecutive players, i.e. T 2 L if T 2 P(S) and T1 [ T2 62 L for any pair T1; T2 2 P(S).




v(T); S 2 N;
i.e. the value of a coalition S is equal to the sum of the values of the coalitions of consecutive
players in its unique minimal partition. From this property it follows immediately that the
characteristic function v is superadditive and that the game v coincides with its restricted
game vr, i.e. v = vr. Moreover, v satis¯es permutational convexity, implying that v has
a non-empty core. More precisely, let u and ` be the two permutations on N de¯ned by
u(i) = i, i = 1;2;:::;n, and `(i) = n+1¡i, i = 1;2;:::;n. Further, denote ¹(v) = mu(v)
and ¸(v) = m`(v) as the corresponding marginal value vectors. Then it immediately follows
that v satis¯es the permutational convexity conditions for the two permutations u and `,
implying that the two marginal vectors ¹(v) and ¸(v) are in the core C(v).
We now want to apply the results of the previous section. Therefore, observe that
the set L of connected coalitions equals the set of connected sets of nodes in the undirected
line graph on N with the set of edges given by E = f(i;i + 1)ji = 1;:::;n ¡ 1g. We can
convert this undirected graph into a linearly ordered hierarchy by taking either player 1
or player n as topman. In the former case the hierarchy is decreasing from 1 to n, in the
latter case from n to 1. Now, let p be a power function representing the hierarchy. In case
player 1 is the topman we have for every S 2 N that
pi(S) < pj(S) when i > j; i;j 2 S (2)
and in case player n is the topman we have that
pi(S) < pj(S) when i < j; i;j 2 S: (3)
The following result follows now immediately from Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 6.1
For any sequencing game it holds:
(i) ¸(v) is the unique element of SC(v;p) when p satis¯es condition (2).
(ii) ¹(v) is the unique element of SC(v;p) when p satis¯es condition (3).
In case (i) player n gets its own value and player 1 is able to extract all gains from
his cooperation with his subordinates, in case (ii) player 1 gets its own value and player n
is the topman who is able to extract all gains from cooperation. To discuss these results,
we now consider the special case of linear costs, i.e., ci(t) = ®it for all t ¸ 0 with ®i > 0. It
is well-known that in this case the characteristic function v is convex, see e.g. Curiel (1988)
19or Hamers (1995). Moreover, in these references it has been shown that under linear costs





where ghk = max(0;®kqh ¡ ®hqk) is the gain of a switch between player h and k in any
ordering such that player h is directly in front of k. Now, the net-costs of player h resulting
from marginal vector ¹(v) are given by the costs of the waiting time in the initial order
minus the savings obtained from cooperation, i.e., the net-costs cu
h(N;q;c) of player h 2 N
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So, according to this solution all the savings obtained from a switch of player h with any of
its predecessors goes to player h. Fern¶ andez, Borm, Hendrickx and Tijs (2005) show that
this cost-assignment rule is the unique solution being stable (i.e. cu(N;q;c) is in the core of
the cost-game for any linear cost sequencing situation (N;q;c)) and satisfying the so-called
property of Drop Out Monotonicity (DOM). Clearly, the stableness property follows from
the fact that ¹(v) is in the core of the cost-savings game. To state DOM, let (N¡k;q¡k;c¡k)
with player set N¡k = N n fkg be the (n ¡ 1)-player sequencing situation obtained when
player k leaves the queue (i.e., job k is cancelled) and let v¡k be the corresponding char-
acteristic function. Then a cost assignment rule r assigning costs rh(N;q;c) for all h 2 N
satis¯es DOM if for any linear cost situation (N;q;c) it holds that
rh(N¡k;q¡k;c¡k) · rh(N;q;c); h 2 N¡k;
i.e. if one of the players leaves the queue, for each of the remaining players the costs are
non-increasing.










h(N;q;c) ¡ min(®hqk;®kqh) < c
u
h(N;q;c); h = k + 1;:::;n:
So, for the players in front of k there is no change in the net-costs, whereas for any player
h after k the decrease ®hqk in initial costs when k leaves the queue is bigger than the loss
20of the cost-savings gkh (if positive) from a switch between k and h. The DOM property
advocated in Fern¶ andez et al. (2002) seems to be very appealing and reasonable: when
player k drops out, the players in front of k are not a®ected, while for the players after k
the costs are decreasing.
On the other hand, let (Nj;q;c) denote the adjusted sequencing situation in which
some player j refuses to cooperate with any player k > j. As a consequence of this refusal
of j, any coalition [i;h], i · j < h, cannot form and hence all the gains gih of a switch
between i and h, i · j < h, cannot be realized anymore. Let vj be the corresponding
characteristic function of the cost-savings game. For S 2 N; let P j(S) be the unique
minimal partition of S in coalitions of consecutive players not containing both j and j +1,
i.e. T 2 L if T 2 P j(S) and if T1 [ T2 2 L for some pair T1; T2 2 P j(S), then j 2 T1 and





v(T); S 2 N;
i.e. the value of a coalition S is equal to the sum of the values of the coalitions in its
unique minimal partition P j(S). From this property it follows immediately that the net-










i=1 gih = cu
h(N;q;c); h = 1;:::;j;
Ch(½0) ¡
Ph¡1
i=j+1 gih; h = j + 1;:::;n:
Comparing this with the costs cu
h(N;q;c) of the original situation, it follows that the costs
do not change for the players 1;:::;j, whereas a player h after j looses all the gains gih,
i · j, and therefore su®ers from an increase in the costs with
P
i·j gih. So, the unique core
outcome satisfying DOM has the serious drawback that it does not give any incentive to a
player to cooperate with its successors in the queue: not cooperating does not hurt her. To
make the point more clear, consider a two player sequencing situation. Of course, nothing
happens if the initial order of 1 before 2 is optimal already. So, suppose it is optimal to
reverse the initial order and to place 2 in front of 1 generating a decrease g12 of the costs.
According to the payo® vector ¹(v), this decrease is fully assigned to player 2. Why should
player 1 be willing to cooperate by agreeing to take the second position? On the contrary,
player 1 has the power to play the noncooperative ultimatum game and to o®er the ¯rst
place in the queue to player 2 if player 2 is willing to give all the gains of this change to
player 1, i.e. player 1 is willing to sell his place against a price equal to ®1q2 (the additional
costs of waiting for player 1) plus the gains g12 of this trade.
Extending this reasoning we obtain that any player j < n can decide upon whether
or not to cooperate with his successors. This is modelled by the hierarchy with player one
as the topman and a corresponding power function satisfying condition (2). According to
21Corollary 6.1 then ¸(v) = m`(v) is the unique element in SC(v;p). So, the marginal vector
¸(v) is economically stable and socially stable with respect to a social structure re°ecting
the dominance of any player j over its successors in the sequence. The resulting costs








ghj; h 2 N:
Of course, this cost rule does not satisfy DOM, but any player i gets the gains of switching
with her successors and therefore is willing to cooperate with her successors.
7 The water distribution problem
In their paper `Sharing a river' Ambec and Sprumont (2002) consider the problem of the
optimal distribution of water to agents located along a river from upstream to downstream.
Let N = f1;:::;ng be the set of agents, numbered successively from upstream to down-
stream and let fi ¸ 0 be the °ow of water entering the river between agent i ¡ 1 and i,
i = 1;:::;n, with f1 the in°ow before the most upstream agent 1. Agent i, i = 1;:::;n,
has a quasi-linear utility function given by ui(xi;ti) = bi(xi) + ti; where ti is a monetary
compensation to agent i, xi is the amount of water allocated to agent i; and bi:I R+ ! I R a
continuous non-decreasing function yielding the bene¯t bi(xi) to agent i of the consumption
xi of water. An allocation is a pair (x;t) 2 I R
n
+£I R










fi; j = 1;:::;n:
The ¯rst condition is a budget condition and says that the total amount of compensations
is non-positive, i.e. the compensations only redistribute the total welfare. The second
condition re°ects that any agent can use the water that entered upstream, but that the
water in°ow downstream of some agent can not be allocated to this agent. Because of
the quasi-linearity and the possibility of making money transfers, an allocation is Pareto
optimal if and only if the distribution of the water streams maximizes the total bene¯ts,
i.e. the water distribution x¤ 2 I R
n












fi; j = 1;:::;n: (4)
A welfare distribution allocates the total bene¯ts of an optimal water distribution x¤ over
the agents, i.e. it is a vector z 2 I R





i). Clearly, any welfare distribution can be implemented by the allocation (x;t)
with xi = x¤
i and ti = zi ¡ bi(x¤
i), i = 1;:::;n.
22The problem to ¯nd a reasonable welfare distribution can be modelled as a TU-
game. Obviously, for any pair of players i;j with j > i it holds that the water in°ow
entering the river before the upstream agent i can only be allocated to the downstream
agent j if all agents between i and j cooperate, otherwise any agent between i and j can
take the °ow from i to j for its own use. Hence, only coalitions of consecutive agents
are admissible. Clearly, for S = N, v(N) =
Pn
i=1 bi(x¤
i) with x¤ 2 I R
n the solution of
























fk; h = i;:::;j: (5)
Without loss of generality we normalize the bene¯t functions by taking bi(fi) = 0, implying
that v(fig) = bi(fi) = 0, i = 1;:::;n, so that the values v(S) for jSj ¸ 2 represent the
net-gains of cooperating. Again, for an arbitrary coalition S 2 N, the value v(S) is equal




v(T); S 2 N;
with P(S) the minimal partition as de¯ned in the previous section. Clearly, the game v is
superadditive, v = vr, and hence it follows from Granot and Huberman (1982) that v is
permutationally convex for the permutations u and `. Consequently, both marginal vectors
¹(v) and ¸(v) are core solutions. In case all functions bi are di®erentiable with derivative
going to in¯nity as xi tends to zero, strictly increasing and strictly concave, Ambec and
Sprumont (2002) have even shown that the game is convex and hence that the core contains
all marginal vectors.
Under the conditions for convexity, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) have shown that
the marginal vector corresponding to the permutation u is the unique element in the core
of the game satisfying a so-called fairness condition. This condition (quite di®erent from
the fairness condition of Myerson to characterize the Shapley value) says that any coalition
S gets at most its aspiration level, being the highest utility it can obtain when it may use
all the water of all the agents 1;:::; b s, where b s = maxfs j s 2 Sg. Clearly, this implies that
any coalition [1;j] can get at most v([1;j]), j = 1;:::;n, so that it trivially follows that
indeed the marginal vector mu(v) assigning ¹i(v) = v([1;i]) ¡ v([1;i ¡ 1]), i = 1;:::;n, is
the unique candidate in the core satisfying the aspiration requirements. For the proof that
it indeed satis¯es the requirements we refer to Ambec and Sprumont (2002).
23As in the sequencing situation again we have that the payo® vector ¹(v) has the
property that when a player j does not want to cooperate, the players in front of j, including
j itself, are not hurt. Like in the sequencing game, this is a very counterintuitive outcome.
Although any upstream coalition [1;j] can prevent that coalition [j + 1;n] gets more than
v([j + 1;n]) by using all °ows f1;:::;fj by itself, all bene¯ts from cooperating go to the
coalition [j +1;n]. Again the outcome ¹(v) has the serious drawback that it does not give
any incentive to a player j to cooperate with its successors in the queue. Repeating the
reasoning once more, again consider a two agent situation. In this case there is no gain of
cooperation when in the optimal solution player 1 fully consumes its upstream in°ow f1.
However, suppose it is optimal to allocate a part of f1 to the second agent. According to
the outcome ¹(v), agent 1 is just compensated by agent 2 for its loss of utility, i.e. player
1 receives a compensation t1 = b1(f1) ¡ b1(x¤
1), giving her utility b1(f1) = v(f1g) = 0 . So,
like in the sequencing game, there is no reason for player 1 to cooperate. However, player 1
has the power to play the noncooperative ultimatum game and to pass the stream f1¡x¤
1 to
player 2 if this player is willing to give up all the gains of cooperation, i.e. player 1 is willing
to sell this stream against a price (or compensation) t1 equal to v(f1;2g)¡v(2) = v(f1;2g).
Player 2 is indi®erent to accepting this o®er or not and therefore is willing to accept the
o®er (or any slightly lower price). Also in this river game we may argue that player 1 is in
control of whether or not to cooperate by letting through a part of its water in°ow f1. In
general, any player is in control of cooperation with its successors. This can be modelled
by a hierarchy consisting on the line graph with player 1 as the topman and corresponding
power function satisfying condition (2). According to Corollary 6.1, ¸(v) is the unique
element in the socially stable core, yielding an outcome re°ecting to a social structure in
which any player j dominates its successors in the sense that player j controls the water
in°ow up to j.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we consider structured transferable utility games. In such games each coalition
is organized according to some social structure, for instance a network, a hierarchy or some
other dominance relation. There exist several measures in the literature to measure the
power of the players within a coalition having some social structure. In this way the social
structure of a coalition can be represented by a power vector. A collection of coalitions
is stable if weights can be assigned to these coalitions such that the total weighted power
of every agent is the same. Stability generalizes the well-known concept of balancedness,
where all members of a coalition have the same power. The socially stable core consists of
the economically stable payo® vectors that are sustained by a stable collection of coalitions.
24The socially stable core is a subset of the superadditive cover core, and therefore of
the core whenever the game is superadditive. We provide several results on non-emptiness
and uniqueness of the socially stable core. If the game is convex, then the socially stable
core is non-empty for any social structure. Also, the socially stable core is non-empty
if for some permutation the game is permutationally convex and the power function is
permutationally consistent. If the game is permutationally convex and the power function
is permutationally compatible, then the socially stable core consists of only one element,
being the marginal vector corresponding to the permutation. Generically, the socially
stable core consists of a ¯nite number of elements only. Therefore, the socially stable core
is a forceful selection device for the superadditive cover core.
The socially stable core concept is applied to structured hierarchy games. Under
rather mild conditions the socially stable core of a structured hierarchy game consists only
of a speci¯c marginal vector. This vector is completely determined by the hierarchical
structure on the players. The sequencing problem and the water distribution problem are
modeled as two examples of structured hierarchy games. As a consequence, we are able to
advocate a unique solution for these two problems.
In this paper the social structure has been given exogenously. In the network liter-
ature, the social structure is the result of a link formation process. It would be interesting
to combine insights provided by this paper with those coming from the network formation
literature. In this way one can both endogenize the social structure and the distribution
of network payo®s, which opens up an interesting line of further research.
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